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Príce Inertia in a Macroeconomic Model of Monopolistic Competition~)
by Th, van de Klundert and P. Peters
Introduction
If one accepts the vtew that prices are~iot fully flexíhle macroeconomic analysis has a long way to go. First, with prices fixed in the short run rationing in markets becomes a central issue. Second, if price adjustment takes time the questton is how price levels are determined in the course of ttme. Models with quanttty ratíoning and prtce adjustment based on excess demand functions have been investigated by a number of authors. As shown among others by McCurdy and Yannelís [1985] and van de Klundert and Peters [1985] stabilíty of the Walrasian equilibrium may cause problems if the time path of prtces crosses the boundary between the regime of Keynestan Unemployment and the regime of Repressed Inflation. Proposed solutions to this problem lead to an extension of ad-hoc procedures. Such procedures are critized fundamentally by Fisher [1983] . Price adjustment accordínx to excess demand functions impltcitely assumes a Walrasian auctioneer. There is no agent who actually sets prices.
in this paper we aím at an analysís of opt}mal price tnertia in -~. a macroeconomic context. Entrepreneurs are supposed to maximize the present value of thetr fírm at each poínt ín time. in the output market the Eirm envisages monopolistic competition, because of product differentiatton. There are costs attached to price chanRes as discussed ín a wellknown paper by Barro [1972] . Further, we assume that entrepreneurs liave perEect foresight. Thís set of assumpttons corresponds with that of Rotemberg [1982] with three not unimportant exceptions. First, Rotemberg ) The authors thank Lex Meydam and Rick van der Ploe~for their valuable comment on a previous version of thís paper.
eliminates the possíbilíty that fírms rr~tion [heír customers in the market for goods. Followin~, Broer [1985] we take account of the possihility of a classícal dísequílihrium under monopolis[ic competition. The second difference with Rotemberg's analysis concerns the problem of capital accumulation. Here again we keep company with Broer by analysing the long-run adjustment of the capital stock along the línes set out by Hayashi [1982] and others. Whereas Broer sticks to partial equilihrium analysis we want to consider the eEfects of macroeconomíc shocks in a model with endoKenous output price adjustments. Third, Rotemberg assiunes that the labour market is competitive: wages are fully flexible and demand always equals supply. In this paper we assume that it takes some time to clear the lahour market.
The assumption of monopolistíc competition implíes that long-run equilibria are non-Walrasian. A dis~ussion of the welfare implícatíons would require a choice-theoretic specificatfon of consumer behaviour as for instance in Calvo and Phelps [1983] . Here we shall restrict our analysis to macroeconomíc issues. For this purpose a standard specification of the consumption function and the liquidity preference function will do in order to close our model.
The paper is organized as follows. ln section 2 the optimal behaviour of Eirms under monopolistic competítion and perfect foresight is analysed. Section 3 builds upon the results of this analysis hy incorporating the behavioural equations in a model for the whole economy.
Simulation results of this macroeconomic model are díscussed in section 4. The paper closes with some conclusions.
Optimal behaviour oE firms under perfect foresight
Output of fírms (y~) ís non-storable and can be produced by a neo-classical produc[ton function:
(1) 
The model has the format of an optimal control problem with ínstrument variables A, i, s and state variables k, p. The Hamiltonian of this problem dropping time subscripts is:
The costate variables q and u are adjoínt to the sta[e variables P k and p. The Lagrangean multiplier a relates to the demand constraínt (2a). This constrafnt ís written as an equality by applyinb the slack variable z.~`) The symbol a can be interpreted as the shadow price of sales revenue.
) For an analysis oE ínequalíty constraínts in optimal contcol problems see Hadley and Kemp [1971, ch. 5] .
Necessary first order condítions for an optimcun dividíng out ). equal terms are .
, where n -p~p.
The complementary slackness condition (10) implies a~0 iE z-0. In this case:~--~. Substituting this result in (7) and (11) gives:
If z~0 we have a-0 and equattons (7a) and (lla) are still valid.
Cxistence of an optimal policy can be proven along the lines set out in Broer [1985] .
To simplify a little hit we assume that the adjustment function with regard to príces is quadratic:
(5a) 1 2 n -2~s ) In addition we have the usual transversality conditions:
The full model describing optimal behaviour by firms can then be written as:
For given w and p the model gives a solution for y,~" k, t, p, q, u, a, z. There are two regímes depending on a-O or a~0. In case a-0 we have z~0 and the firm is not operating on the demand curve for íts product on the short run. Consumers are ratíoned, because labour is too As appears from inspection of (l3g) and (14) The case of an outward shift of the demand curve is presented in figure 3 . If the demand constraint bites less a will fall and become eventually nega[ive. However a has a lower bound of zero and in that case there will be some slack. In fiRure 3a it is assumed that a remains positive. Therefore, the system of differentíal equations (l3g) and (14) determines the adjustment process from the old equilibrium indicated bỹp l towards the new long-run value pZ. Following the shock the costatẽ variable u jumps to a point on the stable arm of the saddlepoint p2,
Output is raised to meet demand at the existíng príce pl, After this initial adjustment firms gradually increase prices and output declines until the new equilibrium is attained. The movement along the stable manifold SS' can be described by the difEerential equation:
Figure 3a (1-n)fR Figure 3b where~i~0 is the stable root.
In the case presented in fígure 36 there is a larger increase in demand and a has to be set at zero initíally. There is still a jump in output at t-0, but the rise in output is not enough to meet demand at [he existing price level; consumers are ra[ioned in the market for goods. The real wage rate equals the marginal product of lahour. Firms adjust prices gradually and at p-p3 in figure 3b a situation is reached where demand and supply are again equal.~) From then on a rises towards its equilibrium value unity and firms are able to explott there monopoly position. It should be observed that the ínitial jump in u must be such that the stable arm of the saddlepoint p2 must be attained when p equals p3.
Changes in the nominal wage rate w can be analysed in a similar way. However, in this case there is no initial change in output. An increase in the wage rate for example leads to an upward adjustment of the w ) The value of p3 can be found from equations: f~(2,k) -P and f(Q,k) -a(~)-n. 
) In Svensson [1985] there is a continucun of firms defined by the unit interval 0~j~1, where each fírm is indexed by j.
It can then be shown that the system of demand equations defined by (16) and (l7) is consisten[ with maximization of the utility function:
(18) U -F y(n-1)~n j-1 j , subject to the expenditure constraint:
In equilibrium all firms choose the same price, hence p. -p for all j. J Firms consider the príces of other firms as given. The equilibrium could therefore be coined a Nash-Ra[ional F,xpectattons Equilibrium as suggested by Rotemberg [1982] . The necessary condítíon for an optimum at the firm level can now be applied also on the macroeconomic level where total demand (y) equals the sum of aggregate consumption (c) and aggre- The supply of money (M) is exogenous, while the demand for money follows from the standard specification:
The nominal interest rate rather than the real interest rate should be in equation (2l). As observed by 8lanchard [1983] the present specificatíon eliminates the "Mundell effect".
) The implication of this approach is that investment goods are of different quality, and qualities are chossen according [o preferences specified ín equation (18). This is the "price" to be paid if one wants to avoid the modelling of a two-sector economy.
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Labour supply is exogenous. The nomínal wage rate responds to excess demand ín the market for labour over tíme. Following ftlanchard and Sachs (1982] we assume that households supply all the labour demanded by firms, which means that firms are never constrained ín the market for labour. The regime of Repressed Inflation is therefore eliminated.
The full macroeconomíc model can now be formul.ated as follows: In models with monopolistic competitton it can he shown that the employment function has the real wage rate and effective demand as explanatory variables, if. the elasttcity of demand with respect to the relative price depends on output (see Eor instance Layard and Nickell [1985] ). In our model the employment function depends upon the prevailing regime as follows from equations (22b) Blanchard and Sachs [1982] , van de Klundert and Peters [1985] .
For a-0 we get:
This is the classical regime: investment is governed by the return to capi[al. As shown by Hayashi [1982] the shadow price q is then equal to 15~) the observable average value of capital (Tobin's q).
In a stationary state we have: k-q-p-u-w-0. Substituting these conditions in equations (22R)- (22p) gives the followíng longrun solutions: u~-0, a~-1, R~-Rs, i~-ók~. It should he noted that in the long-run equilíbrium sítuation the demand constraint is binding (a-1). In case a would be zero, y would be zero too, which does not make economic sense. It will be assinned tliat the marginal valuation of present consump[ion in terms of future consumption is independent of the absolute size of. the consumption stream. As observed by Rose [1966] the consumption function is then homogeneous of. the first degree in y and k:
To simplify fur[her we assume:~l -0. The long-run model may now be r written as:
) It should be noted that thís result is obtained under the condition of constant returns to scale both in productlon and installatton: the Eunctions f and g are linear homogeneous. Cos[s of price adjustment ought to be ígnored.
, wíth the symbol a indicating a qualíty índex for labour. Inspection of the model reveals that q~is determined by eqc~ation (24c), whereas the capital output ratio follows from equations (24a) There are three roots with negative real parts and two roots with positive real parts corresponding wi[h the number of respectively the predetermined and the non-predetermined state variables. Therefore the model exhibits saddle-point stability. Blanchard and Sachs [1982] ).
The development of employment over ttme is governed by demand and supply factors. As effective demand decreases employment declines and in period t-2 there is even some unemployment. Capital decumulation in combination with a fall in real wages reverses the situation and from period t-1() onward labour demand and labour supply are more or less
balanced. As appears from table 2 the process of adjustment towards the new long-run equilibrium last some time in the present case.
Conclusions
It is tnteresting to note that the results of our model are tn a number of ways qualltatively different from those of disequilibrium models as for instance presented by Blanchard and Sachs [1982] , van de Klundert and Peters [1985] . In the present analysis rationing of consumers seems a somewhat remote possibílity, at least starttng from a long-run equilibrium position. A macroeconomic demand pull leads to an increase in output in the short run, becaiise firms change prices slowly while at the same time they want to sell more at the going price.
As emphasízed by Rotemberg [1982] in case prices adapt without a time lag changes in the quan[ity of money have no effect on real variables even if firms are monopolis[s. It sliould be noted that this result differs from the view expressed by Hart [1982] that imperfect competition as such implies a model with Keynesian features. However, Hart analyses imperfectly competitive equilibría where demand shocks relate to a shift in demand for the produced good versus the non-produced good.
The ad-hoc modelling of the labour market remains an unsatisfactory aspect of the model presented here. To deal wíth this problem one could opt for a model of wage setting hy firms or labour unions.
Costs of wage adjustment could then eventually be introduced to allow for disequilibrium in the labour market. Extensions like these are certainly on our agenda. Thís situation is reminiscent of classícal disequilibrium. Otherwise firms produce according to demand, but may not realize the preferred position in the short run. In section 2 of the paper these problems are analysed from a microeconomic perspective.
In section 3 the model is extended to a full macroeconomic model by making demand endogenous. Wage formation is modelled in a traditional way by assuming that wages respond to excess demand in the market for labour. Because the model becomes rather complex full analytical solutíons are now out of reach. Instead numerical exercises are worked through by applying the techntque of multiple shooting.
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